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Information Institutions and the Political 
Accountability in Bangladesh 
 
Md Mahmudul Hoque 
 
Abstract: Accountability of the elected leaders is one of the key factors in a representative democracy. Bangla-
desh restored a democratic ruling system in 1991 but has struggled to create an effective institutional mecha-
nism to hold the political leaders before the citizens. Information has often been called the oxygen of democracy 
because of its power to bring accountability through transparency and public disclosure. With the boom of news 
media organisations and the emergence of the movement for the right to and freedom of information in the early 
2000s, many argued that information institutions could build the mechanism for political accountability. On that 
background, Bangladesh enacted the Right to Information Act in 2009 and established a few key public infor-
mation institutions including the Information Commission (IC) and Access to Information Programme hoping 
that the freedom of information would not only challenge the culture of secrecy and veil but also encourage the 
elected leaders to be answerable to the citizens. But did it really happen? Why? I looked for the answers in this 
study though the conceptual and analytical lens of freedom of information, proactive disclosure and accounta-
bility. For this study, I mainly used the data and cases gathered from secondary sources namely policy papers, 
reports, newspapers, journals, books and online spaces. I also utilised my own experience of working with a few 
state organisations. I analysed the current status of accountability mechanisms in Bangladesh focusing mainly 
on the political accountability (often called the vertical accountability). I also examined a few recent cases in 
order to understand the role of the information institutions in bringing the political accountability in the current 
fragile democracy in Bangladesh. Considering the poor democratic practices in the recent years, findings of this 
study suggest that the accountability of the political leaders has increased to a certain considerable extent. I ar-
gue that this is partly because of the increased transparency and proactive disclosure in the formal and informal 
institutional mechanisms, and mostly because of the leading active role of the mass media organisations. I con-
clude with the argument that despite having this increased transparency and freedom of information, this im-
proved accountability is not sustainable without an effective democratic institutional mechanism. 
  
Key words: Right to information, Freedom of information, Political Accountability, Information institutions 
 
 
——————————      —————————— 
Introduction 
Information is often claimed to be ‘the oxygen of de-
mocracy’ (Bassey, 2009). This takes us back to the 
third wave of democracy during the mid-1990s 
(Skaaning, 2013 p, 97) when the movement for the 
right to and freedom of information took place in 
many developing countries, particularly in South Asia. 
Due to the extensive demand from the civil society 
and human rights organisations, India enacted Right to 
Information Act in 2005 (Webb, 2010) which immedi-
ately fuelled the movement in neighbouring countries. 
Bangladesh followed the path of India and enacted this 
‘Revolutionary Act’1 (Roberts, 2010) in 2009. This 
enactment instigated hope among many civil society 
organisations and common people that this Act would 
 
1 Roberts (2009) termed this Act as ‘Revolutionary’ meaning that this Act was origi-
nated in a revolutionary way and, would bring revolutionary changes in the way infor-
mation floats in the society and state mechanism. 
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empower citizen to hold the government accountable 
(Iftekharuzzaman, 2011 p, 2). The Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh termed this enactment as an epoch-making 
incident in the history of Bangladesh and told that it 
would greatly help establish accountability and trans-
parency in every sphere of society and the administra-
tion (Cited in Iftekharuzzaman, 2011). As Bangladesh 
restored democracy in 1991, and there were a several 
formal ways to hold the administration of the Gov-
ernment especially the elected officials accountable 
before the citizens (Mollah, 2005). These accountabil-
ity mechanisms were namely the parliament, judicial 
systems, and traditional Audit and Accounts Depart-
ment of the state. These mechanisms in Bangladesh 
could not grow as effective institutions (Buchmann, 
2013; Opel, 2010). The right to information Act came 
as a new mechanism which not only gave the citizens 
the right to seek information from public offices but 
also asked public offices to disclose and free infor-
mation through various means (GOB, 2009). Reports 
claim that despite having many limitations, the Act has 
made public offices more alert to provide and disclose 
information (Bari et al, 2016). My interests and ques-
tions originated from this. 
Since 1991, Bangladesh created a number of demo-
cratic institutions in both public and socio-political 
spheres. The boom of privately owned media, both 
print and electronic, brought a culture of asking ques-
tions on behalf of the citizens in the early 2000s. The-
se media emerged as an informal institutional ac-
countability mechanism. The Right to Information Act 
(RTI), 2009 paved the way of informal and formal ac-
countability mechanisms. The government established 
a few formal information institutions to ensure the 
freedom of information. So, on one hand, the citizens 
had the right to seek and have information; and on the 
other hand, the media could use the information to 
hold elected officials accountable before the citizens. 
Hypothetically, the mechanisms were set to hold the 
public officials accountable before the citizen. But, did 
it really happen? Why? The answers lie in how these 
institutions and mechanisms affected political ac-
countability in Bangladesh, and if they were effective. 
Bhuiyan (2011) argued that the RTI has affected the 
bureaucracy and the way the administration functions 
which supports my own experience to an extent, alt-
hough the effectiveness can be questioned. To answer 
the question in this paper, I focus on the accountability 
of the elected or nominated representatives or officials 
in Bangladesh, and the activities of selected infor-
mation institutions.  
I argue that in the context of the right to information 
and increasing transparency in public offices through 
proactive disclosure of information, the political ac-
countability has been on the rise. Although the citizens 
are not very interested to utilising the law to ask for 
information or answers directly from their representa-
tives, the concerned laws and institutions have created 
an environment where elected political leaders or offi-
cials are placing themselves before the citizens in 
some ways. The evidence and my observations sug-
gest that this considerable development in political 
accountability is the result of very vibrant actions from 
journalists, and civil society members through main-
stream media (including social media that I do not fo-
cus in this paper). 
 
In the first part of this paper, I shall discuss the main 
concepts used in the argument namely around the 
political accountability and the freedom of 
information. I shall also briefly include the context of 
political accountability in Bangladesh. In the second 
part, I shall highlight what are the major information 
institutions in this context and how these institutions 
are contributing to increasing political accountability 
in Bangladesh, and in the last part, I shall conclude 
with my arguments and analysis. 
 
PART I: Concepts and Context 
 
Political Accountability and the Bangladesh 
Context 
The main idea behind accountability as Lindberg 
(2009) noted, ‘when decision-making power is 
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transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an 
agent (e.g. government), there must be a mechanism in 
place for holding the agent to account for their 
decisions and if necessary for imposing sanctions, 
ultimately by removing the agent from power’. To 
Joshi (2015), the elements of accountability are the 
authority to hold accountable, the standards, the 
answerability (information and justification) and the 
enforcement mechanism. This accountability can be 
internal, external, formal or informal; it also can be 
vertical or horizontal (Mohmand, 2016). 
Accountability may take place in different forms of 
linkages between the citizens and elected officials 
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007) during the period of 
representation. The following diagram (figure 1) 
shows how different kinds of accountability 
mechanisms (horizontal, vertical and diagonal) work 
in a democratic setting like Bangladesh. In an ideal 
situation, the vertical (political) accountability works 
through formal institutional mechanisms, while in 
many not-fully-functioning democracies, the diagonal 
accountability where the bureaucrats are held 
accountable before the citizens on behalf of the elected 
officials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, what I mean here by political 
accountability is the ability of citizens to ask questions 
to their elected or nominated representatives as well as 
to get an answer or explanation. It also encompasses 
the mechanisms in a state that hold the elected 
political leaders to give the accounts of their duty, 
power and authority derived from the public. I also 
mean that if the existing practices, rules and 
regulations create an environment where the political 
leaders feel to or do not have a choice but to provide 
their accounts (or justifications) is an accountability 
mechanism. It can also merely be if the political 
leaders are doing what they promised in terms of 
policymaking and implementation during the election, 
and if they are being transparent enough. In this paper, 
I focus and discuss this political accountability in a 
functioning democratic atmosphere. By information 
institutions, I mean the institutions that derived from 
the idea of people’s right to information and 
transparency.  
 
In Bangladesh, the concept of accountability may be 
the same, but the context is definitely much different 
than many other democratic or less democratic 
countries around the world. In a parliamentary 
democracy like Bangladesh, parliament is supposed to 
hold the government and other elected public office 
holders accountable on behalf of the people. The 
members of Parliament (MPs) are supposed to 
represent the interests of their electorates. However, 
since Bangladesh restored democracy in 1991, in most 
cases MPs of the main opposition party boycotted the 
parliament and refused to participate in the 
parliamentary sessions (Al-Jazeera, 2013). This 
absence of MPs results in the passing of the bills 
uncontested and the MPs of the ruling party were seen 
reluctant to join the parliamentary sessions. This has 
been a recent political practice and this is how the 
main institutional accountability mechanism in 
Bangladesh has been paralysed.  
 
With that background, the current Awami League-led 
government came to power through January 2014 
election in which the main opposition Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party did not participate, and according to 
a 2014 election report of the Election Commission, 
only around 22% voters turn out to vote. News reports 
Figure 1: Accountability Mechanisms (Mohmand, 2016; 
Fox, 2014) 
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claimed the percentage much less than that. More 
significantly, 153 electorates which are more than 50% 
of the total electorates of 300 were elected unopposed 
without any poll (Ahmed, 2014). The election came as 
a real surprise for those who believed that election is 
the backbone of an electoral democracy (HRW, 2014), 
especially given the fact that the previous election in 
2008 was much free and fair (AP, 2008). Kumar 
(2014) states that in a democratic country, it (the 
election) was a shock and many civil society 
organisations and the opposition political parties 
termed this election ‘undemocratic’ and demanded re-
election as they thought it was a political monopoly of 
Awami League. Awami League formed the 
government again and Jatiyo Party, the main political 
alliance of Awami League, took the opposition 
positions in the parliament and sarcastically also held 
a few cabinet positions in the government. 
 
These underdeveloping political events were neither 
good for democracy nor for accountability. Many 
political parties and a corner of the civil society 
claimed that the government, to an extent, showed its 
autocratic nature in decision making as it refused to 
give space for other political parties to protest. By 
doing so, the government was able to stop violence on 
the street and the common people more or less like it 
as they witnessed the massive political protests and 
violence throughout the year of 2013. In this 
background, very few people expected the elected and 
nominated (those who were elected unopposed) 
political leaders would be accountable to the citizens. 
Basically, the traditional accountability mechanism2 
that Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin (1999 p, 9) noted 
on policymaking and implementation process in a 
representative democracy hardly works in Bangladesh.   
 
From Right to Information to Proactive Disclosure 
and Transparency 
 
2 Przeworski et al. (1999) explains the policy process in a democratic settings as 
preferences→signals→ mandates→policies→outcomes; and this works between the 
citizens and the elected officials. If the elected offical fail to deliver, then the 
accountability mechanism works in the forms of sanctions. 
The concept of Right to Information is a right-based 
approach towards the freedom of information. 
Bangladesh gave the right to citizens to ask for 
information through the RTI Act which according to 
many was crucial for bringing transparency (Sultana, 
2012 p, 67). However, the more important and crucial 
aspect of the Act was that it paved the way of 
proactive disclosure of information. While discussing 
proactive disclosure, Darbishire (2011 p, 3) noted:  
‘There are two main ways by which information held by 
public bodies can be accessed by the public. The first is 
when individual members of the public file requests for and 
receive information (reactive disclosure). The second is 
when information is made public at the initiative of the 
public body, without a request being filed. This is known as 
proactive disclosure and the result is proactive transparency 
which can be achieved using a multiplicity of means 
ranging from publications and official gazettes, to publicly 
accessible notice boards, to radio and television 
announcements, to posting on the Internet via a public 
institution’s website.’  
 
In the context of accountability in general both 
reactive and proactive disclosure are significant but 
the latter, in my observation, contributes to bringing 
political accountability in Bangladesh which is also 
the focus of this paper. The preamble of the Right to 
Information Act, 2009 says that it is expedient and 
necessary to make provisions for ensuring 
transparency and accountability in all public, 
autonomous and statutory organisations and in other 
private institutions constituted or run by the 
government or foreign financing. Section 6 of the Act 
states the provisions of the publications of information 
and directs that ‘every authority shall publish and 
publicise all information pertaining to any decision 
taken, proceeding or activity executed or proposed by 
indexing them in such a manner as may easily be 
accessible to the citizens’. These provisions set the 
base of proactive disclosure and transparency in 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
PART II: Information Institutions and Political Ac-
countability in Bangladesh 
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Information Commission 
As directed in the Right to Information Act, 2009, 
Bangladesh immediately established an Information 
Commission (IC) which broadly has two major tasks; 
one is to oversee the implementation of the right to 
information policies in Bangladesh, and second is to 
work as the appellate authority for mitigating any 
complaint about violating the Act or rules by any pub-
lic office holders3. Much was expected from this 
Commission in terms of implementation of the right to 
information policy and many have argued that the 
commission did not meet this expectation (Bari, 2014 
p, 2). But, the annual report (2014) of the commission 
demands the opposite. According to the report, despite 
many challenges the commission has considerable 
successes in facilitating people to use this law to ob-
tain information, as well as pushing public offices to 
disclose information in their websites. As Bari (2014 
p, 2) also noted that an increasing number of people 
including the journalists are using this law to hold the 
public officials accountable before the citizens. I be-
lieve this is where the success of the commission an 
institution is unnoticed.  
 
Over the years, the commission has listened to 124 
complaint cases (IC, 2014) and punished a number of 
government officials, as well as directed many elected 
officials to provide citizens with the information they 
were rejecting to give at the first place. This diagonal 
accountability really worked in Bangladesh in many 
cases. For instance, while working at the District Ad-
ministration (DA), I have witnessed a case in Sirajganj 
where a journalist took information about the number 
of Jatra4 from DA (ordered by IC as it lost the case 
against the journalist) and published a report how 
much money those Jatras were generating for the lo-
cal Member of Parliament. This news generated a pro-
test5 in the local area (Mollah, 2012) and eventually 
 
3 Visit the website of Information Commission for more information about their du-
ties and responsibilities: www.infocom.portal.gov.bd 
4 Jatra is a kind of local theatre where petty crimes like gambling take place at night 
5  The video of this protest is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATGRTF0Sl5M  
the local MP had to stop those Jatras. There are many 
such cases IC has facilitated political accountability.  
Theoretically, as most of the MPs are elected unop-
posed (they were declared winners before the elec-
tion), the vertical accountability (Mohmand, 2016) 
that voters would ask directly do not much work. The 
point here is people found a way (in most cases diago-
nal or the short route) to ask questions to their repre-
sentative by using the institutions of the right to in-
formation, guided and guarded by the commission.  
 
Information and Communication Technology Act 
The 2013 amendment of the Information and Com-
mission (ICT) Act, 2006 is another byproduct of Right 
to Information in Bangladesh. The Awami League as a 
political party before forming the government prom-
ised in 2008 to build a ‘Digital Bangladesh’ (Karim, 
2010), and this ICT Act was amended to institutional-
ise that political agenda into reality. This Act directed 
all public office to have their own websites including 
the offices of elected representatives and publish all 
information (including the financial and budgetary). 
This legal framework was a landmark for ensuring ac-
countability through transparency mechanism (Khan, 
2015).   
 
The making of digital Bangladesh brought new mech-
anisms of transparency and accountability. Access to 
Information (a2i), a jointly run project by the Gov-
ernment of Bangladesh and United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) has been working to make 
all important information disclosed before the public. 
In 2014, Bangladesh launched the largest public web 
portal in the word containing 25,000 websites of pub-
lic offices at the national, regional and local levels (Is-
lam, 2014). These websites are continuously updating 
information about necessary information that helps 
political leaders to explain their decisions and policies 
as well as to bring transparency.   
 
Due to this political commitment to bring transparency 
and accountability through e-governance, the whole 
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accountability organism got improved. Freedom of 
information and proactive disclosure are the key fac-
tors here. Before the political leaders (national and 
local level representatives such as MPs, local govern-
ment leaders and politically nominated or elected offi-
cials) used to receive funds for implementing varied 
development projects and there was almost no mecha-
nism to hold them accountable. Now, the information 
regarding who got what are all published in their re-
spective ministry or government office websites. In-
formation regarding budget, tendering, job opportuni-
ties and beneficiaries get published. Social safety net 
programs can be cited as a good example. Before, lo-
cal political leaders used to utilise programs like cash 
transfers as means of providing benefits to their rela-
tives and supporters. Now, the list of beneficiaries gets 
published on local government websites. This trans-
parency helps bring political leaders accountable 
(Khan, 2010).  
 
Proactive disclosure has also enforced accountability 
to the top leaders of the government including the 
ministers and advisors. The Aid Information Manage-
ment System (AIMS) is a good example how it is 
working as a one-stop-shop for all information related 
to foreign assistance in Bangladesh. AIMS records and 
processes information provided by donors on devel-
opment activities and related aid flows in the country. 
Several years back people did not have an idea how 
much foreign aid money was coming to the country 
and how much of it was being spent on particular pro-
jects. Journalists had to use their investigative skills to 
reveal the information before people. Now, AIMS web 
portal6 publishes all these information including aid 
and projects allocated for ministries, MPs and local 
political leaders. Besides these proactive actions, as 
Uddin (2015 p, 36) noted that the electronic tendering 
has created opportunities to make the whole public 
procurement process transparent and accountable.  
 
The ICT institutions within the sphere of political 
 
6 For more information please visit http://aims.erd.gov.bd/ 
commitment towards good governance through elec-
tronic means have paved the way for civil society or-
ganisations and news media to ask questions to the 
political leaders on behalf of the citizens. Nowadays, 
before taking any decisions regarding a policy, law or 
bill, the government publishes a draft in their respec-
tive public website where people can criticise, suggest 
or comment on the policy. If there is anything flawed, 
civil society organisations and media can make it a 
public agenda and ask the government to change or 
adjust it before it passes through the Parliament or the 
Cabinet. Thus, the whole information and disclosure 
system are helping elected political leaders being ac-
countable before citizens. 
 
Anti-Corruption Commission and Election Com-
mission 
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and Election 
Commission (EC) are two major state institutions that 
create mechanisms to hold the elected officials ac-
countable. What Fox (2014) talked about having 
“teeth” in terms of social (diagonal) accountability, I 
believe, in the case of Bangladesh, transparency has 
given these teeth to these two institutions. Fox (2014) 
argued that the accountability mechanisms need the 
capacity to sanction what he referred as “teeth”. Pre-
viously many civil society organisations have claimed 
that ACC in Bangladesh had been toothless 
(Bdnews24, February 2, 2010). But, the Right to In-
formation Act, 2009 and the proactive disclosure 
mechanisms have lately made them more effective. 
In recent years, the EC has made it mandatory to de-
clare the assets of candidates that are going to take 
part in any elections. EC has published this infor-
mation on the website. Elected public officials includ-
ing the ministers and MPs are required to submit their 
asset description in every two years to EC. Any citizen 
can avail the information about the assets that he or 
she was had before the election and compare it with 
the current achievements. Media can publish the report 
is about this as well. In many cases, both ACC and EC 
worked together to disclose corruption cases of elected 
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officials. Though these two institutions have not been 
able to be highly effective over the years, but certainly 
people can see the improvement. 
 
I can mention about one case here. On Aug 21, 2014, 
the ACC filed a case against current MP Abdur 
Rahman Badi accusing him of concealing assets of Tk. 
110 million. EC commission gave information to ACC 
that this Awami League MP had given false infor-
mation about his possession of assets before 2008 and 
2013 elections (Bdnews24, 2015). He is awaiting the 
verdict from the Supreme Court. Despite some criti-
cisms (see Mehta, 2012), the performance of ACC in 
terms of fighting corruption has been better in recent 
years due to the availability of information. Lately, EC 
has sacked many local-level elected officials for being 
corrupt. It has also arrested hundreds of public serv-
ants in August and September 2016 (Kaler Kantho, 
October 31, 2016). These incidents have created fear 
among the elected political leaders, especially at re-
gional and local levels. 
 
Active and Effective Press  
It is a proven fact that media as an information institu-
tion can play a big role to hold political leaders ac-
countable before the people in a democratic country. 
The media boom in the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
in Bangladesh strengthened the watchdog mechanism. 
The right to information and proactive disclosure 
along with the press freedom guaranteed by article 39 
of the constitution (GOB, 2015) offer a lot for the me-
dia activists and journalists to ask questions to the 
elected leaders and bring answers for the citizens. As 
Ali (2006) analysed the role of media in Bangladesh 
and recognised media’s immense influence over gov-
ernance. Nowadays, Journalists in Bangladesh are us-
ing the right to information effectively to get infor-
mation about public finances, project expenditures, 
budgets etc and asking questions to policy makers 
through news media (Ahmad, 2010) which definitely 
has improved the accountability of elected officials.  
Television channels broadcast a number of regular po-
litical talk shows and debates in which they invite po-
litical leaders including the MPs, Ministers and local 
government leaders. As Rahman and Marjan (2014) 
found that these TV talk shows try to create confronta-
tion between political leaders in power and in opposi-
tion, and try to create a shadow parliament to hold the 
political leaders accountable. As the Parliament in 
Bangladesh has become a monopoly of Awami League 
and its alliance MPs, people do not have much faith in 
the Parliamentary Committee’s performance to hold 
the elected ones accountable. Media in Bangladesh is 
definitely filling in the gap. 
 
Part III: Argument and Analysis 
 
I have drawn the below diagram (figure 2) to show 
how citizens utilise their right to information and pub-
lic office websites to get and claim answers to the 
elected political leaders at the top. The diagram de-
picts the current political accountability mechanisms 
in Bangladesh. The political leaders use reactive and 
proactive disclosure mechanisms to offer their answers 
and justifications for the questions that citizens ask by 
themselves or through using formal and informal insti-
tutions. Information is produced as the accounts. The-
se accounts bring the answerability and responsiveness 
among the political elected officials. The institutions 
have certainly help or force both the citizens and the 
political leaders to participate in this accountability 
mechanism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Improved Accountabilty Mechanism in Bangladesh 
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Due to the activeness of the information institutions, 
the whole accountability mechanisms have increased 
to a considerable extent, especially if we compare the 
current status of political accountability with the status 
of that after 2014 election. This increased accountabil-
ity is, of course, neither sufficient nor an ideal one. 
This has two-folded explanations. One, the press or 
the media has actively produced information that the 
citizens need to ask questions to their elected leaders. 
Political leaders can also use media to provide answers 
and explanations in favour of their actions and behav-
iour. Thus, despite the inactiveness of the formal ac-
countability mechanisms, the media has not only 
strengthened the short route (diagonal) of accountabil-
ity but also facilitated the vertical one. Two, as I dis-
cussed above, the information institutions have en-
sured the freedom of information through both proac-
tive and reactive disclosure of information. This free 
information has been working as accounts in the polit-
ical accountability mechanism and has put an end to 
the culture of secrecy.  
 
This analysis takes us to one major concern. Is this 
increased accountability sustainable? The answer is 
NO for two main reasons. Firstly, as Przeworski et 
al.(1999) argued that the best accountability 
mechanism has to have a formal sanction system. In 
Bangladesh the formal sanction is still not working as 
the voters (Principal) do not have much power in their 
hands in order to force sanctions on the elected official 
(Agents). This absence of sanction power demeans the 
basic value of democracy. Secondly, the institutions 
that are working to hold the political leaders 
accountable in Bangladesh is a network of second line 
formal and informal institutions. According to the 
basic principle of democracy, as Joshi (2015) notes, 
the formal institutions like the Parliament has to take 
the responsibility to ask questions on behalf of the 
citizens. The most effective and sustainable way to 
build a good political accountability system is to make 
the formal instiutions active and responsible, and then 
leave the second line and informal instutitions as 
supportive forces. 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
Although Bangladesh is not a fully functioning demo-
cratic country and it never was, in the last two decades 
it has developed a number of democratic institutions. 
Institutions like the Right to Information, Information 
Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, ICT-based 
governance system, media are those that have actively 
paved the way and created the opportunities to prac-
tice democratic governance in recent years. As many 
rightly argued and claimed that the traditional vertical 
accountability has not been very successful in Bangla-
desh and it is in the worst situation with the 2014 de-
bated national election. However, these democratic 
institutions, as I discussed above, have created a struc-
ture, a system that allows practising political account-
ability. 
 
As I analysed, the Right to Information gave the foun-
dation to these institutions. Then other information 
institutions including political commitments like the 
digital Bangladesh and e-governance are altogether 
ensuring proactive disclosure and a free flow of in-
formation within different democratic institutions. 
This freedom of information brings transparency and 
accountability to the rule of the game. On one hand, 
citizens use this information to ask questions to the 
elected leaders through varied mechanisms including 
media, civil society organisations and the respective 
Commissions. On the other hand, through the proac-
tive and reactive disclosures, the elected or nominated 
political leaders can publish information or answers to 
the question that citizens have. Despite some notable 
limitations in ensuring democratic practices, the Gov-
ernment definitely has shown the commitment to bring 
transparency through the effective use of information 
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and communication technology. I argued that these 
democratic institutions that facilitate and process in-
formation for the citizens of the state are helping to 
bring political accountability in practice. Considering 
the poor democratic practices in the recent years, I 
found a notable increase in political accountability. 
This is partly because of the increased transparency 
and proactive disclosure in the formal and informal 
institutional mechanisms, and mostly because of the 
leading active role of the mass media organisations. I 
also argued that this improved accountability is not 
sustainable without an active and effective formal and 
democratic institutional mechanism to bring the politi-
cal leaders accountable before the citizens. 
______________________ 
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